


# **Pandora's Gamble by Allison Young.**

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**Chapter Snippets:  
Chapters 15 & 16**



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Allison Young is a highly accomplished investigative journalist with a distinguished career. She has worked for various national and regional news organizations, including USA Today, the Detroit Free Press, and The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Young's reporting has focused on a wide range of critical issues, including health, environment, and consumer concerns. She has received numerous prestigious awards for her investigative work notably the Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Award.

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While Palese and Tumpey said they thought that the world's population had at least some level of immunity to the re-created 1918 virus, others questioned the safety and merit of the experiment.

"I believe that this was research that should not have been performed," Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University in New Jersey, said at the time.<sup>26</sup> "If this virus was to be accidentally or intentionally released, it is virtually certain that there would be greater lethality than from seasonal influenza, and quite possible that the threat of pandemic that is in the news daily would become a reality."

Over the years there have been proposals to create an international oversight structure with enforceable rules that would bring independent scrutiny to especially risky biological research.<sup>27</sup> But such proposals have gained little traction, with scientific societies embracing voluntary systems that rely largely on the research community policing itself.

Some argued then—and now—that stakes to humanity are enormous.

In 2007 a think tank at the University of Maryland warned that the extraordinary advances in biology are "arguably becoming one of the most consequential problems of public policy ever encountered."<sup>28</sup>

"Unfortunately," they said, "the capacity to alter basic life processes is not

remotely matched by the capacity to understand the extended implications."

By the spring of 2012, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity voted in support of the publication of Kawaoka's and Fouchier's revised manuscripts.<sup>29</sup> And their two labs went on with their work studying various infectious diseases.

However, it wasn't long before officials at the NIH—which was funding Kawaoka's continued work with engineered H5N1 viruses—were quietly grappling with "significant concerns" about the biosafety practices at his Wisconsin laboratories.

In November 2013, Kawaoka's research team had two accidents with engineered influenza viruses, just a few days apart.



IT TOOK LESS THAN a second. The needle with an engineered H5N1 virus on it accidentally pierced through the glove and into the finger of a researcher working on a Saturday evening inside one of the University of Wisconsin–Madison's enhanced biosafety level 3 labs.<sup>30</sup>

The researcher was using a syringe to collect a sample from a tissue culture, a

And at 9:30 p.m., the injured researcher finally left the lab facility wearing an N95 mask and a glove on the wounded hand, and was driven home to wait out the seven-day quarantine while doing fever checks and taking Tamiflu.



Officials in the NIH office responsible for overseeing research with engineered organisms were alarmed to learn that the university didn't have a dedicated quarantine facility for such emergencies.

In a series of teleconferences that began the day after the incident, university officials told the NIH that regardless of whether an incident posed a high or low risk of infection, the Kawaoka lab's quarantine policy involved having exposed lab workers stay at home, with any family members sent elsewhere.

"This policy is not what was communicated to us in Dr. Kawaoka's application to perform research with mammalian transmissible strains of H5N1," wrote Dr. Jacqueline Corrigan-Curay, acting director of the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities, in a follow-up letter to the university.<sup>38</sup>

"In a May 6, 2013, plan provided to NIH, Dr. Kawaoka indicated that he had access to a 'designated quarantine apartment' in which researchers could be

placed for 10-14 days in the event of an accidental exposure," Corrigan-Curay wrote.

Trying to provide an explanation, university officials told NIH there had been a "miscommunication" between Kawaoka and the university's administration.<sup>39,40</sup>

Wisconsin officials justified their decision to home-quarantine the injured researcher by telling NIH that the needlestick was not expected to put the researcher at high risk of infection and that although the engineered virus contained the HA gene from H5N1, it "was determined not to be a mammalian-transmissible strain."<sup>41</sup> The scientist with the needlestick ultimately completed quarantine without showing symptoms or becoming ill.<sup>42</sup>

But even if the university were to have what it considered a high-risk exposure with a more dangerous strain, the lab worker's quarantine location would still be at home, Rebecca Moritz, a key university official responsible for safety at Kawaoka's labs, told the NIH.<sup>43</sup>

It was a stunning change by the university to a critical safeguard that federal officials thought was in place for the Kawaoka lab's potentially high-risk research.

The NIH demanded that Kawaoka halt all research with mammalian-transmissible H5N1 virus strains until an appropriate quarantine arrangement



procedure that could have easily been done without a needle.<sup>31</sup> In fact, the lab’s safety policies prohibited the use of needles except in specific circumstances—and this wasn’t one of them.<sup>32</sup>

It was a moment of poor judgment and human error around 6:30 p.m. on November 16, 2013, that set off a series of emergency calls that would eventually raise concerns in the nation’s capital.

In the minutes that followed, the scientist sprayed the puncture site with disinfectant, then ran water over the injured finger for five minutes while squeezing blood out of the wound trying to reduce the chance of infection.

Using a radio inside the lab suite, the scientist called out for help to a colleague working in a different lab in another part of the building.

By 6:34 p.m., this co-worker had reached the lab manager, who instructed the injured scientist to try to squeeze a few more drops of blood out of the finger and to keep water running over it for another ten minutes while lab safety and university infectious disease officials were notified.

Just before 7:00 p.m. the lab manager got back to the injured researcher with instructions to “put on new gloves, clean up the work area and then shower out normally. Do not hurry. Go upstairs, sit in the conference room and do not leave the building.”<sup>33</sup>

The lab manager and another lab official made a flurry of calls, consulting with the university’s infectious disease physicians and obtaining the antiviral medication Tamiflu from a nearby Walgreens.

By 8:34 p.m., they had alerted local, state, and federal public health officials.<sup>34</sup> An expert at the CDC told officials at Wisconsin’s state health department that while the likelihood the scientist would develop symptoms of H5N1 was “low,” the needlestick “should be considered a serious exposure” and treated aggressively.<sup>35</sup>

The chief medical officer of the Wisconsin Department of Health Services told the university that the researcher would need to quarantine for seven days and take a treatment-level dosage of Tamiflu twice a day for ten days.<sup>36</sup>

Six months earlier, while seeking funding and approval for the controversial experiments, Kawaoka had assured officials at the National Institutes of Health that the university had a designated quarantine apartment.

But it turned out that wasn’t the case.<sup>37</sup>

When the Wisconsin scientist was potentially exposed by the needlestick on that Saturday evening, lab officials called the researcher’s family and told them they needed to pack up their belongings. Then the university sent a car to take them to a hotel.



with exotic influenza viruses. With all the hospital workers and visitors coming and going, “it would be much harder to control the spread of information and as a result there would be a higher probability of incorrect information being told to [the] general public and potentially members of the media.”<sup>52</sup>

Despite these concerns, the university eventually agreed to NIH’s demands.<sup>53</sup> And on December 24, 2013, the NIH gave its approval for Kawaoka’s lab to resume its research manipulating H5N1 virus strains that were transmissible to mammals.<sup>54</sup>



By 2014 THERE WAS growing discomfort at the highest levels of the U.S. government about the risk of an accident with an engineered virus.

While Wisconsin’s needlestick incident in November 2013 wasn’t publicly known, it had caused significant concern with officials inside the NIH. And it was soon followed by the series of high-profile accidents at federal labs in 2014—from safety breaches with anthrax and avian influenza at the CDC to the discovery of forgotten vials of smallpox that had been kept for decades in a storage room on the NIH campus.

In October 2014, citing the string of recent federal lab incidents, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy announced an unusual “pause” on new federal funding for certain gain-of-function research while the U.S. government began an extensive study of the risks and benefits of these kinds of controversial experiments.<sup>55</sup> The pause involved certain experiments involving influenza viruses, but also those with MERS and SARS coronaviruses.

The federal funding pause remained in place for three years until it was finally lifted in December 2017.<sup>56</sup> During that time, there were multiple scientific meetings where the issues were debated, and there were reports examining the risks and benefits.<sup>57, 58, 59</sup>

Ultimately, the federal review concluded that only a “small subset” of gain-of-function studies were of greatest concern.<sup>60</sup> And when the NIH lifted its funding pause, it announced a new framework for how the agency would oversee future decisions about funding research that potentially increased the danger of pandemic pathogens.<sup>61</sup>

It was only in 2019 that some of the halted federally funded experiments were quietly allowed to begin again<sup>62</sup> under the revised federal oversight process,<sup>63</sup> which was criticized for keeping secret the details of the new experiments<sup>64</sup> and the basis for the government approvals.

was put in place.<sup>44</sup>

A researcher's home, the NIH told the university, was not an appropriate quarantine site for Kawaoka's high-risk studies because influenza viruses can be transmissible through the air, and many residences are in high-occupancy buildings, like apartments, that share air exchange and other infrastructure.

NIH biotechnology oversight officials had additional concerns about other lax biosafety practices that had surfaced in two back-to-back incidents in Kawaoka's labs during 2013.

Just a week before the needlestick incident, another member of Kawaoka's research team was wearing what NIH later considered to be inadequate personal protective equipment when the researcher accidentally spilled a specimen containing a different strain of H5N1 virus.<sup>45</sup>

A culture plate had dropped to the floor while the scientist moved a stack of plates from a biosafety cabinet to an incubator on November 9, 2013. A few drops splashed onto the leg of the researcher's protective Tyvek suit. But the suit had a two-to-three-inch gap near the ankles, exposing the person's skin. None of the drops landed on the person's skin, however.

While UW officials said inspectors for the Federal Select Agent Program had never flagged the suits' ankle gap as a problem,<sup>46</sup> the NIH said that having bare

skin in an enhanced BSL-3 lab was "unacceptable."<sup>47</sup>

"NIH has significant concerns regarding the biosafety practices associated with both of the recent incidents," the NIH Associate Director for Science Policy, Dr. Amy Patterson, and Deputy Director for Extramural Research, Sally Rockey, said in a letter to the university.<sup>48</sup>

NIH demanded the university find a dedicated quarantine facility outside workers' residences, such as a hospital isolation room, or face the suspension or termination of its grant funding.<sup>49</sup>

"For high risk exposures, it is critical to isolate the individual in a structure that does not have shared air exchange and can be quickly and efficiently decontaminated,"<sup>50</sup> the NIH told the university in December 2013.

The university and its medical team didn't want to use the UW Hospital to quarantine Kawaoka's researchers.

They had concerns about the "mental health and physical wellbeing" of researchers "as well as a potential impact on the willingness of researchers to come forward following exposures" if they are sent to restrictive hospital isolation rooms, which "are uncomfortable and confining."<sup>51</sup>

The university officials also worried that quarantining researchers at the hospital would increase the chances the public would learn about its lab accidents



coordinated in consultation with local and state public health officials.

When asked by the Gryphon team whether workers who were only “potentially exposed” would be treated differently from those who were “certainly exposed,” the university gave this answer: “No. People with a known potential exposure would be immediately quarantined as described above. Following any potential exposure, the individual is immediately quarantined until there is consultation with university and local/state public health officials, the PI [principal investigator] and laboratory staff member.”

Not only would “local/state public health officials” be consulted in the event of a potential exposure, but also the university further assured that there were standard procedures for contacting local health officials. And they listed a wide range of information they said would be provided to local and state health officials about a researcher involved in a potential exposure event, including the researcher’s last known entry into the BSL-3 lab, the virus strains they were working with, and the specific biological features associated with those strains—including whether they had the potential for mammalian transmissibility. UW officials also represented that they would share with local health officials the quarantine or isolation procedures that would be followed.

Yet that’s not what happened after the Kawaoka team had its accident during

the ferret experiment in December 2019 involving its infamous strain of lab-created H5N1 influenza virus, the one that had helped spark the worldwide debate over gain-of-function research.

And in the days and weeks that followed, efforts were made to downplay the significance of the event, avoid notifying public health and oversight bodies, and keep the public and policymakers in the dark.

There was a lot at stake.

Not only would the handling of the incident draw attention to safety issues at the University of Wisconsin’s lab, but it would also raise much larger questions about the rigor and effectiveness of the secretive process the U.S. government is using to oversee the riskiest experiments in which scientists are creating enhanced pathogens with pandemic potential.



WHEN THE ACCIDENT HAPPENED on December 9, 2019, Kawaoka’s three scientists were working in a biosafety level 3 agriculture lab suite with enhanced safety features at the University of Wisconsin’s Influenza Research Institute.<sup>74</sup>

This \$12.5 million facility had been built specifically for Kawaoka’s research.



It was constructed with ten-inch-thick concrete walls, infrared surveillance beams,<sup>75</sup> negative air pressure, watertight and airtight seals, double HEPA-filtered exhaust air, and redundant air handling systems.

The experiment they were performing involved a virus whose name describes the components of its engineering: VN1203HA(N158D/N224K/Q226L/T318I)/CA04.<sup>76</sup> It was the virus described in Kawaoka's controversial H5N1 gain-of-function experiments that had been published nearly eight years earlier.<sup>77</sup>

It was the virus that had gained the concerning ability to spread between ferrets and had raised fears it could do this among humans.

Kawaoka's renewed studies with this virus in 2019 were one of the first two research projects approved and funded under the U.S. government's opaque new P3CO framework for overseeing research involving engineered pathogens that have the potential to cause a pandemic.<sup>78</sup>

The work the UW team was doing was part of the group's studies<sup>79</sup> seeking to understand the mechanisms<sup>80</sup> that would allow highly pathogenic H5N1 bird flu viruses to infect and spread among humans.

On that December day, two experienced researchers from Kawaoka's team were helping train a colleague as they collected samples from ferrets. The animals were part of a transmission experiment and had been in contact with other ferrets

infected with this engineered H5N1 virus or another wild-type flu strain.

The three scientists wore several layers of personal protection equipment.<sup>81</sup> Their lightweight full-body Tyvek suits, made of high-density, spunbonded fibers and worn over hospital scrubs, provided a barrier against infectious droplets and splashes.

Their shoes, covered in Tyvek booties, were dedicated for use only when inside the lab. That, too, helped to guard against organisms hitching a ride to the outside world. They also wore two pairs of gloves with Tyvek sleeve covers for added protection.

One of their most important pieces of PPE was the powered, air-purifying respirator that each wore to ensure they didn't breathe any air inside the laboratory. Even though they were using a biosafety cabinet, there was always the potential for invisible, aerosolized virus to be present in the room's air.

These kinds of high-tech respirators, called PAPRs (powered air purifying respirator), encase workers' heads in a protective hood with a clear faceplate. A blower attached to a belt delivers purified air through what looks like a vacuum cleaner hose that runs up the scientist's back and attaches to the hood behind their head.

Labs are responsible for training workers how to properly assemble and use

this kind of equipment.

As one of the senior researchers was preparing to start collecting samples from the next round of ferrets, the trainee realized there was a problem with their respirator.

The PAPR hose had somehow become disconnected from the unit that supplied safe, filtered air. Instead, the detached hose dangled loose in the lab's potentially contaminated air.

The hose was "immediately" reconnected, Wisconsin officials later said, and one of the experienced researchers radioed out to the lab's operations manager as the trainee began the process of exiting the lab.<sup>82</sup>

It was a significant incident, especially because it involved the H5N1 avian influenza virus that had been engineered to be capable of spreading in mammals—and potentially humans.

After consulting with a university lab compliance official, the trainee was told to follow the lab's quarantine procedure to keep them from coming into contact with others and spreading the virus if they were infected. The university would later say this was done "out of an abundance of caution."<sup>83</sup>

But at some point, a lab compliance official released the worker from quarantine.

It is unclear whether this quarantine release happened within minutes, hours, or days of the incident occurring. Nor is it clear whether university officials first consulted with any public health and oversight agencies.

The University of Wisconsin–Madison wouldn't answer most of my questions about what happened.

What I was able to piece together after months of reporting reveals troubling gaps in the oversight of high-risk experiments. And it raises questions about the ability of the current fragmented system to ensure public safety.



If there were ever a virus requiring that everyone follow safety and incident reporting rules, this was it. The system of oversight in place that day had been created in response to the international furor over this very virus.

Yet after the trainee's respirator hose disconnected in December 2019, the university didn't notify local or state public health officials about the incident or consult with them before discontinuing the trainee's quarantine,<sup>84</sup> despite representations going back years indicating this would occur following "any potential exposure."<sup>85</sup>

The university says it didn't need to notify them. That's because UW officials, in consultation with the university's health experts, made their own determination that no potential exposure had occurred.<sup>86</sup>

Officials at Public Health Madison & Dane County, the local health department, told me they have no authority over UW–Madison, which is on state property, and that they defer to the university's judgment and expertise when it comes to lab safety issues.<sup>87</sup>

"Public Health Madison & Dane County is not and does not need to be notified of something that was determined to not be a significant exposure. It is also not incumbent on us to further evaluate whether there was a significant exposure, if UW reports that there was not," the department said.<sup>88</sup>

The university also didn't immediately alert other key oversight entities that the public relies upon to ensure the safety of this kind of particularly risky research.

UW officials waited two months—until February 10, 2020—to file a report that should have been made immediately to the NIH Office of Science Policy, which oversees U.S. research with genetically manipulated organisms like the engineered H5N1 influenza virus involved in the experiment.<sup>89, 90, 91</sup>

Records show the university's internal biosafety committee, which had

approved the Kawaoka lab's research, wasn't "apprised" of the December 9, 2019, incident until February 5, 2020.<sup>92, 93</sup>

The university was less slow in reporting the incident to the federal funding officials at NIH's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which provided the grant for the controversial experiments. But UW still waited ten days—until December 19, 2019—to report the incident to NIAID program staff, according to information provided to me by NIH officials.<sup>94</sup>

The grant's terms required immediate notification in the event of an "illness or exposure."<sup>95</sup> It was UW's contention, however, that "neither of the two criteria were met" because there was "no reasonable risk of virus exposure," NIH officials told me.<sup>96</sup> When the university eventually notified grant officials, it said it was doing so "in the spirit of transparency and responsible conduct of research," the NIH said.

The university says Kawaoka "informed his program officer at NIH in early December," before following up with an incident summary on December 19.<sup>97</sup>

As I pressed NIH to reconcile the agency's statement with UW's account, a few more details emerged. NIH said that the first time UW contacted anyone at the agency was on December 12, 2019—three days after the incident. That's when UW first requested a phone call from an NIAID program officer. A first discussion



about the incident happened on December 13, and on December 16, during a follow-up discussion, NIAID staff asked UW to send in a written description of the incident.

Both NIAID director Anthony Fauci and NIAID principal deputy director Hugh Auchincloss “were briefed about the incident,” the NIH said in a written response to my questions. But NIH would not tell me when Fauci and Auchincloss were briefed or whether they provided guidance on how the UW incident should be handled.<sup>98</sup>

On December 19, UW sent in a write-up about what happened and NIAID forwarded the incident information to a contact within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ secretive P3CO structure that oversees and approves funding for research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens.<sup>99</sup>

But the P3CO process is focused on “pre-funding” reviews of “proposed” research and this incident involved experiments already underway, a spokesperson at HHS told me; the agency that had the authority to investigate was the CDC select agent program.<sup>100</sup>

The program’s guidance indicates that a PPE failure involving a select agent pathogen, like UW’s H5N1 virus, is a potential occupational exposure that is required to be reported immediately to lab regulators at the CDC.

UW officials said Kawaoka’s lab immediately reported the incident to the CDC’s select agent regulators.<sup>101</sup> But the university didn’t answer my questions about why the incident was immediately reported to the CDC—and not NIH—given UW’s stated position that there wasn’t any potential exposure.

It is unclear whether Kawaoka’s team consulted the CDC in advance of the university’s decision to release the researcher from quarantine. CDC officials—including Dr. Samuel Edwin, who heads the select agent program—didn’t answer my questions about this.

Just three months before the December 2019 ferret incident, CDC select agent inspectors cited the university for a “serious” violation<sup>102</sup> involving failure to ensure the immediate reporting of a release of a select agent pathogen outside of primary biocontainment barriers, according to a heavily redacted copy of the inspection report that I obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act.

The CDC blacked out from the document all of the details about the incident, including the type of pathogen involved, and wouldn’t answer any questions about what happened. The university would say only that this violation did not involve Kawaoka’s lab.<sup>103</sup>







WHEN THE UNIVERSITY FINALLY notified the NIH Office of Science Policy about the ferret incident—two months after it happened—UW officials unsuccessfully tried to justify their significant delay by saying the incident was “not reportable.”<sup>104</sup>

Wisconsin officials told the NIH Office of Science Policy that even though the trainee’s PAPR tube had detached, in their view there was “no potential exposure” that had to be reported to this oversight office.<sup>105</sup>

The university’s justifications included that the ferrets had been handled inside a certified and properly working biosafety cabinet and that the contact ferrets had only been exposed to infected ferrets for about twenty-four hours “and were not shedding virus yet.”

The university also told NIH officials that “the air the observer would have breathed during the few seconds the hose was disconnected would have come from inside the PAPR hood, which would have been HEPA-filtered before the hose disconnected.” The lab’s report to the NIH doesn’t say how they determined this.

The reason UW finally told the NIH oversight office about the incident was because officials at the Federal Select Agent Program—as well as the NIH office

that funded the research—“recommended” it be reported.<sup>106</sup>

The report UW finally submitted to the NIH Office of Science Policy includes the following notation: “\*Confidential—do not release this information without written authorization of the University of Wisconsin–Madison.”

What were the consequences of UW’s delayed reporting of the incident? The NIH Office of Science Policy told me it “reminded the institution about its reporting responsibilities under the *NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules* and noted that it should have been immediately reported to OSP.”<sup>107</sup>

If NIH delivered that message, UW officials say they never heard it. “Multiple people from UW-Madison took part in conversations with OSP after the incident and none of them recall OSP telling the university the incident should have been immediately reported,” a UW spokesperson said by email. “This is certainly the kind of information we would have remembered or recorded in notes taken at the time.”<sup>108</sup>

UW repeatedly pointed to a short email from an NIH analyst thanking the university for its February 10, 2020, report and adding that “the actions taken in response to this incident appear appropriate.”<sup>109</sup> NIH says this email was only referring to UW’s “biosafety actions,” not to the university’s failure to file an

immediate report.

In the end, the trainee apparently didn't become infected. But how the university and the lab oversight system handled the incident should be cause for concern.

When I initially contacted the university, a spokesperson took issue with me asking detailed questions about the incident and the lab's policies, first saying UW officials needed more time to answer them; then, after I asked over multiple days how much time they would need, they told me to file a public records request.

"It is all too easy to sensationalize this research, to misconstrue events, and misrepresent the nature of incidents rightfully reported by institutions to regulatory agencies," said Kelly Tyrrell, UW's director of media relations, in a 1,146-word email that spoke in broad brushstrokes about the importance of research, the humanity of researchers as parents, siblings, and community members, and how sometimes there can be differences in interpretations of incident reporting requirements and about regulations.<sup>110</sup>

Tyrrell said UW takes safety seriously and that the Kawaoka lab has never had an incident where public health or safety have been put at risk.

"There are few people in the world trained to understand the nature of the pathogens involved, the biosafety and biosecurity measures in place and the

protocols developed and followed," Tyrrell continued. "Most people are also not equipped to appropriately evaluate the risk. It is unfortunate that some seek to capitalize on this knowledge gap."

In the months that followed, UW didn't answer many of my questions. Still, Tyrrell's email made references to what she said was the lab's track record of transparency and openness with journalists.



THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN is just one of the places around the world where a small but growing number of scientists are engineering microbes in potentially dangerous ways.

When you ask experts in biosafety, public health, and national security about the kinds of laboratory safety breaches that worry them the most, they point to the subset of research that involves deadly microbes that have been engineered or synthesized in a laboratory and that are capable of spreading easily from person to person.

If such a pathogen were to be released from a lab—either accidentally, such as through a worker unknowingly becoming infected, or intentionally by a

Chinese horseshoe bats in a cave in Kunming, in China's Yunnan Province, during 2011–2012. It was an important discovery: SHC014 turned out to be one of the two closest known relatives to the first SARS virus that caused the 2002–2003 epidemic.

Finding these viruses was part of a project that Shi had helped co-lead with Peter Daszak, president of a U.S.-based nonprofit called EcoHealth Alliance that worked on global health and conservation issues. Daszak's and EcoHealth's collaboration with Shi over the years would involve both financial support and co-authorship on several journal articles.

Nearly a decade later, after the virus that causes Covid-19 emerged to kill millions of people worldwide, the scientific relationships between Shi, Daszak, and Baric would come under intense scrutiny. Their history is integral to understanding why there are legitimate questions about whether a lab accident in Wuhan, or perhaps a biosafety lapse during a bat virus-collection trip, could have been the source of the pandemic.

But back then, Baric was just one coronavirus researcher asking another coronavirus researcher to share some data for an experiment.

He told *MIT Technology Review*<sup>11</sup> that he had heard Shi speak at a conference around 2012 or 2013 about some newly discovered coronaviruses, including

SHC014. Baric asked her if she might be willing to share the virus's genetic sequence so that he could re-create it in his lab.

Baric was particularly interested in the sequence for its “spike” protein, a key feature that coronaviruses use to enter cells and cause infections. Shi quickly shared the sequences, even before publishing her 2013 paper.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the U.S. gain-of-function moratorium, the NIH allowed Baric to continue his work with SHC014,<sup>13</sup> eventually deciding that his experiments didn't meet the criteria to be halted.<sup>14</sup>

Inside his North Carolina lab, Baric created a hybrid virus using a reverse genetics system for coronaviruses that he had pioneered<sup>15</sup> several years earlier. He combined the spike from Shi's bat coronavirus SHC014 into the backbone of a SARS coronavirus that had been adapted for study in mice.

This lab-created hybrid virus—made up of parts of different viruses—is what is referred to in virology as a chimera. It's a name with roots in mythology, where it is often described as a creature that was part lion, part goat, and part serpent, which had the ability to breathe fire.

The chimera created in Baric's lab had the ability<sup>16</sup> to infect a dish of human airway cells, an indication it could pose a threat to people.

The team had thought this chimera, with its spike protein coming from a bat



virus, would have to first spend time learning to infect cells in another kind of animal before it would be able to infect human cells.

That’s the sequence of events that scientists think happened before the first SARS virus emerged in 2002–2003. That SARS virus went from infecting bats, to then becoming able to infect other wild animals like palm civets,<sup>17</sup> which in turn started spreading the virus to people when these wild or farmed creatures were sold for food in live markets.

The results of the team’s experiments showed the potential for SHC014 to jump from bats directly to humans. It underscored the danger lurking in what are estimated to be thousands of coronaviruses circulating in wild bat populations, Baric said.<sup>18</sup>

“So this is not a situation of ‘if’ there will be an outbreak of one of these coronaviruses but rather ‘when’ and how prepared we’ll be to address it,” he said.<sup>19</sup>

Baric’s creation of the chimera renewed concerns about the risks posed by experiments that made viruses more dangerous.

“If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory,”<sup>20</sup> Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, said at the time. Others, like Stanley Perlman, a coronavirus expert at the University of Iowa, said the chimera

virus probably wouldn’t be able to spread widely<sup>21</sup> in people without more adaptation in humans.

It’s important to note, as UNC told me, that the chimera created in this study was “a very different strain” from the coronavirus that would later cause Covid-19.

Baric was prepared for the creation of the SARS-like chimera to cause a backlash. The published research paper<sup>22</sup> included a section detailing the enhanced biosafety and biosecurity precautions taken by his team in UNC’s biosafety level 3 lab.

The “potential to prepare for and mitigate future outbreaks must be weighed against the risk of creating more dangerous pathogens,”<sup>23</sup> Baric and his team argued.



THREE MONTHS AFTER THE chimera paper was published, Baric’s team had an accident with one of its lab-created coronaviruses.<sup>24</sup>

A researcher was weighing infected mice on February 4, 2016, when one bit her.<sup>25</sup> Its sharp little teeth pierced through her double gloves, then plunged into



her right ring finger, delivering a potential injection of the virus.

The incident occurred inside the team's BSL-3 lab, despite all its safety enhancements, special gear, and protocols.

The medical director for the university's occupational health program discussed "options for isolation" with the researcher and lab officials.

Instead, the researcher was allowed to move about in the community for the next ten days while waiting to see whether she was infected. She just was asked to wear a surgical mask and report her temperature twice daily.

The university, NIH, and select agent lab regulators at the CDC refused, when I asked, to explain the potential risks to the public or discuss why the researcher wasn't quarantined until it was known she wasn't infected.

Records show Baric's lab had immediately reported the mouse bite to CDC lab regulators and provided the agency with repeated updates throughout the researcher's medical monitoring period.<sup>26</sup> The researcher ultimately did not get sick.

Neither NIH nor the university would describe the nature of the modifications made to the virus.<sup>27</sup>

Eventually, by using a federal Freedom of Information Act request, I obtained documents showing the 2016 incident involved a "mouse adapted SARS CoV

(MA15)."

This lab-made MA15 virus was developed several years earlier to cause in mice the kinds of severe SARS disease symptoms experienced in humans.

When my reporting with Jessica Blake revealed the mouse bite incident<sup>28</sup> in an article for ProPublica in August 2020, it wasn't just news<sup>📰</sup> to the general public. It was the first time that grant officers at the NIH's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—who were helping fund Baric's research—were hearing about the safety breach.

"Was this February 2016 incident reported to NIAID and, if so, for which grant was this incident report filed?" asked an email from a staffer in NIAID's Office of Extramural Research Policy and Operations, attaching a copy of our ProPublica article that had published two days earlier.<sup>29</sup>

Agency officials were trying "to determine whether UNC followed proper procedures with respect to reporting biosafety incidents," the staffer wrote, kicking off an email string<sup>30</sup> that was obtained by journalists at the Intercept as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the NIH.

NIAID staffers found nothing about the mouse-bite incident in their files on Baric's grants.

"That just seems to indicate that they do not have their house in order," Filippa

Lentzos, co-director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College London, told the Intercept.<sup>31</sup> “It underscores that as a funder, NIH is not the independent oversight body that you would want for this kind of research.”

While the grant officers were unaware of the incident, the Baric team had properly reported it, as required, to a different branch of NIH that oversees research with genetically engineered organisms. In yet another example of the fragmented oversight of risky research, the two NIH offices apparently didn't have any mechanism or practice for sharing incident reports.

The 2016 mouse bite wasn't the only incident in Baric's lab in recent years.

From 2015 through early 2020, it was one of four incidents with lab-created SARS or MERS coronaviruses that resulted in eight UNC researchers<sup>32</sup> having to undergo medical monitoring as a result of potential exposures.

And in each case, records indicate these eight lab workers were allowed to move about in public while they waited to see whether they would develop symptoms. None ended up getting sick.

It was only after the Covid-19 pandemic emerged in early 2020 that records show UNC restricted one lab worker's movements following a safety breach with a lab-created coronavirus.

That UNC scientist, who was bitten in April 2020 by a mouse infected with a

strain of SARS-CoV-2 adapted for growth in mice, was told to quarantine at home for fourteen days,<sup>33</sup> even though it wasn't clear their skin was broken.

UNC told the NIH that “we are treating this as a medium/high risk exposure.”



LIKE SO MANY LABS, UNC tried to conceal from the public key details about its safety breaches, deleting references to the involvement of SARS viruses from the incident reports it was required to release to me—not only under North Carolina's public records law, but also as a condition of its NIH funding.

When UNC sent over a 170-page PDF of all incidents that labs across its campus had reported to the NIH from January 2015 to June 2020, university officials didn't disclose that they had withheld any information.<sup>34</sup>

Yet scattered throughout the thousands of sentences in that sometimes-mind-numbing PDF were a few places with odd spots of extra white space between words.

It turned out that UNC officials had redacted the documents in a crafty way—essentially erasing words from the records—providing no obvious markings of what they had deleted. But SARS is a short acronym, and I suspected that was

what had been removed.

As a condition of receiving federal funding for its research, UNC is required to make public copies of its institutional biosafety committee's meeting minutes plus any incident reports involving genetically modified organisms. These public transparency requirements are a part of the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules.<sup>35</sup>

To further public trust in the safety of scientific research, the principles of public participation and transparency are "integral" to the NIH Guidelines, the NIH said in a 2014 memo to hundreds of labs<sup>36</sup> specifically reminding them that they are required to provide these records to the public on request.

"In keeping with the NIH Guidelines, institutions may redact certain information from these documents if there are privacy or proprietary concerns. However, information that is widely available from numerous other sources (e.g., agent names and names of principal investigators) is not generally considered private or proprietary," the memo said.

But labs like UNC regularly violate these transparency requirements.

At most, if someone files a complaint about the withholding of public records—as I have dozens of times over the years—NIH staffers will simply "remind" the lab of their obligations under the NIH guidelines.

That's usually enough to get the lab to follow the rules. But it wasn't with UNC, forcing the NIH to eventually step in and tell me that the redacted pathogen names involved types of "SARS-associated Coronavirus."

The accidents at UNC came amid Baric's decades-long quest to combat coronaviruses, which the university notes contributed to the development of Moderna's Covid-19 vaccine as well as antiviral medications like remdesivir and molnupiravir.

"Dr. Baric's research has helped us chart a path to safety and recovery during the pandemic,"<sup>37</sup> UNC system president Peter Hans said in 2021, as Baric received an award recognizing faculty who have "made the greatest contribution to the welfare of the human race."

That same year, Baric was elected into the prestigious National Academy of Sciences, a nonprofit society of scholars founded in 1863 through an act of Congress that was signed by President Abraham Lincoln. The academy is charged with providing independent and objective advice to the nation on scientific issues.

"Baric's work has expanded our understanding of RNA virus genetics, pathogenesis, cross-species transmission, and evolution,"<sup>38</sup> said academy president and geophysicist Marcia McNutt, as Baric walked across the stage to sign his name into the academy's registry book during his induction ceremony.



Membership in the academy, through the vote of other academy members, is considered one of the highest honors a U.S. scientist can receive.



While scientists from the Wuhan Institute of Virology were listed as co-authors of the controversial 2015 scientific paper about the SARS-like chimera, the potentially risky experiments were done at the University of North Carolina.

The credit given to the Wuhan lab was largely in recognition of the institute's top coronavirus researcher, Shi Zhengli, providing the genetic sequence<sup>39</sup> of the spike from the bat virus SHC014.

But Shi's team at the Wuhan Institute of Virology—with U.S. funding from the National Institutes of Health through WIV's partnership with Peter Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance—was soon working to make their own coronavirus chimeras.<sup>40</sup>

The Wuhan lab focused some of this genetic tinkering on a SARS-like bat virus they called WIV1.<sup>41</sup> The NIH says that the chimeras created with the agency's funding and published in the scientific literature and public databases “were so far distant from an evolutionary standpoint from SARS-CoV-2... that they could

not have possibly been the source of SARS-CoV-2 or the COVID-19 pandemic.”<sup>42</sup>

The WIV-EcoHealth team had created their own reverse genetics system<sup>43</sup> based in part on work pioneered by Baric.<sup>44</sup> This gave Shi and her team the ability to more easily manipulate the genomes of bat coronaviruses in the ways that Baric's lab was doing in North Carolina.



There was a troubling difference, however, between the safety precautions taken in Wuhan and those in North Carolina.

Shi's team at the Wuhan Institute of Virology was doing some of its work with bat coronaviruses in biosafety level 2 labs, some of their published research shows.<sup>45</sup>

BSL-2 labs operate with far fewer safety precautions and less high-tech equipment than the enhanced BSL-3 lab at UNC, where Baric's team wore powered air-purifying respirators to protect against inhaling the airborne viruses that they were studying.

Not only would any lab-created viruses pose risks, but so would natural bat viruses, especially those that were newly collected with properties that weren't






**Destiny Rezendes** @dezzie\_rezzie

May 23 · 17 tweets · [dezzie\\_rezzie/status/1661078565494898706](https://twitter.com/dezzie_rezzie/status/1661078565494898706)

1 🧵 Outrage & confusion has the the constant & current state of anyone paying attention-outrage at politicians & policies which have failed so many of us. Despite being a researcher focused on [#C19](#), I again have been shocked at more damning evidence...

2 🧵 For most people, late 2019 was the last months that held some semblance of normalcy. In December 2019, the first samples of C19 were collected in China, then called a cluster of "pneumonia's." <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/world/asia/china-SARS-pneumonia.html>

3 🧵 The official [#narrative](#) that was forced on the public denied the possibility of a lab leak origin. They vehemently claimed the outbreak was most likely caused by a "spillover event." Today, multiple agencies claim the lab leak is valid.




4 📖 Previously undisclosed & shocking information has since come to light: NIH, in fact, DID fund risky virus research which resulted in a bio-lab incident that was instantly downplayed, & covered up in December of 2019.-It was kept completely secret until Feb of 2020

## Relevant Works by Alison Young:



\*\*\*I personally have read both and recommend both. Also, I do NOT get any form of compensation for recommending this, nor have I asked permission to promote the book. I simply applaud the research found in Young's work and find it valuable to public as a whole. I purchased a copy off of amazon so I know it is available if you want to read it.



5 📖 While that could be how some would characterize Covid-19's outbreak in [#Wuhan](#), it's not, however, what I'm referring to. Instead of Wuhan, think Wisconsin. Dec. 9th 2019 a lab incident occurred at the BSL-3 operated by the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

instructions to "put on new gloves, clean up the work area and then shower out normally. Do not hurry. Go upstairs, sit in the conference room and do not leave the building."<sup>31</sup>  
The lab manager and another lab official made a flurry of calls, consulting with the university's infectious disease physicians and obtaining the antiviral medication Tamiflu from a nearby Walgreens.

Six months earlier, while seeking funding and approval for the controversial experiments, Kawaoka had assured officials at the National Institutes of Health that the university had a designated quarantine apartment.  
But it turned out that wasn't the case.<sup>32</sup>

And at 9:30 p.m., the injured researcher finally left the lab facility wearing an N95 mask and a glove on the wounded hand, and was driven home to wait out the seven-day quarantine while doing fever checks and taking Tamiflu.


\*\* Excerpts Shown are from *Pandora's Gamble* by Alison Young

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6 📖 Alison Young, a former [#USAToday](#) journalist and now author has released both an article & book. The article is linked below and it is only a sliver of her incredible book exposing these lab incidents and coverups.



**Lab-created bird flu virus accident shows lax oversight of risky 'gain o...**  
New book reveals lax oversight and efforts to avoid reporting an accident involving a controversial flu virus at a University of Wisconsin lab.  
<https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2023/04/11/lab-leak-accident-h-5-n-1-virus-avi...>

7 📖 The article tells of a covered up BSL-3 lab incident in December of 2019, here, in the US at Kawaoka's lab at University of Wisconsin-Madison. The compromised pathogen is multitudes more lethal than Covid-19 was Young proves the coverup put unsuspecting millions at risk.

NIH biotechnology oversight officials had additional concerns about other lax biosafety practices that had surfaced in two back-to-back incidents in Kawaoka's labs during 2013.

Just a week before the needletick incident, another member of Kawaoka's research team was wearing what NIH later considered to be inadequate personal protective equipment when the researcher accidentally spilled a specimen containing a different strain of H5N1 virus.<sup>43</sup>

A culture plate had dropped to the floor while the scientist moved a stack of plates from a biosafety cabinet to an incubator on November 9, 2013. A few drops splashed onto the leg of the researcher's protective Tyvek suit. But the suit had a two-to-three-inch gap near the ankles, exposing the person's skin.

The university officials also worried that quarantining researchers at the hospital would increase the chances the public would learn about its lab accidents with exotic influenza viruses. With all the hospital workers and visitors coming and going, "it would be much harder to control the spread of information and as a result there would be a higher probability of incorrect information being told to [the] general public and potentially members of the media."<sup>44</sup>

**\*\* Excerpts Shown are from *Pandora's Gamble* by Alison Young**

**PANDORA'S GAMBLE**

December 24, 2013, the NIH gave its approval for Kawaoka's lab to resume its research manipulating H5N1 virus strains that were transmissible to mammals.<sup>44</sup>

While Wisconsin's needletick incident in November 2013 wasn't publicly known, it had caused significant concern with officials inside the NIH. And it was soon followed by the news of high-profile accidents at federal labs in 2015—three safety breaches with animal and avian influenza at the CDC to the discovery of long-term viral stockpiles that had been kept for decades in a storage vault at the NIH campus.

The Kawaoka lab was one of the first to receive approval and NIH funding under this new oversight process.<sup>45</sup> which required review by a secretive panel of scientific experts called the P3CO Review Group.

The NIH acronym stands for "Potential Pandemic Pathogen Core and Oversight."

The names of the experts conducting the reviews are secret as are the details of how they make decisions, a policy Kawaoka officials justify as necessary "to preserve confidentiality and to allow for candid critique and discussion of individual proposals."<sup>46</sup>

**\*\* Excerpts Shown are from *Pandora's Gamble* by Alison Young**

December 24, 2013, the NIH gave its approval for Kawaoka's lab to resume its research manipulating H5N1 virus strains that were transmissible to mammals.<sup>44</sup>

✱

It was only in 2019 that some of the halted federally funded experiments were quietly allowed to begin again<sup>62</sup> under the revised federal oversight process,<sup>63</sup> which was criticized for keeping secret the details of the new experiments<sup>64</sup> and the basis for the government approvals.

The KAWAOKA LAB WAS one of the first to receive approval and NIH funding under this new oversight process,<sup>65</sup> which required a review by a secretive panel of scientific experts called the P3CO Review Group.

**\*\* Excerpts Shown are from *Pandora's Gamble* by Alison Young**

Some of the Previously undisclosed Lab Incidents in the US since 2010		
Institution	University of Wisconsin-Madison	University of UNC-Chapel Hill
BSL Level:	BSL-3	BSL-3
Pathogens Involved	Lab Created H5N1 Pathogenic Avian Influenza	SARS/MERS, SARS-like CoVs, & lab created/altared SARS-like CoVs
Lead Scientists	Kawaoka	Ralph Baric
# of Incidents	(2011, 2013, 2013, 2019) 4 known, but possibly more.	(2015, 2016, 2018, 2020.) 4 known, but possibly more.
Were they Federally Funded?	YES. Before, during and after incidents & the moratorium.	YES. Before, during and after incidents & the moratorium.



8 📖 Unfortunately, this lab incident isn't new in the US, nor was it new at the lab from the 2019 incident. Kawaoka's research, after all has been so risky that it was in part the progenitor of the 2014 GoF moratorium after he "accidentally" made [#H5N1](#) more transmissible.

DR. ANTHONY FAUCI 11/23/2022

Page 1

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA  
3 MORRIS DIVISION  
4 ----- X  
5 THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,  
6 Plaintiffs,  
7 V. Case No. 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KIM  
8 JOSEPH R. BIERE, JR., et al.,  
9 Defendants.  
10 ----- X  
11 Bethesda, Maryland  
12 Wednesday, November 23, 2022  
13 Videotaped Deposition of DR. ANTHONY FAUCI, a  
14 Defendant herein, called for examination by counsel  
15 for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter, pursuant

As a Reminder, these statements were made in November of 2022, & he would like you to believe he "doesn't know" who Shi Zheng-Li is... He's either playing dumb, or he's too senile to remember. Either way, it shows that he was unqualified for the position he had leading the American people against the pandemic. Also, his statements on "Asian names" is hypocritical for a man who criticized Trump for calling Covid-19 the "Wuhan Flu".

4 Q. Now about the person that's listed  
5 immediately before him listed here as Zhengli Shi?  
6 Do you know who that is?  
7 A. I believe, if I'm correct, that this is a  
8 scientist who is at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,  
9 I believe. I'm not a hundred percent certain. I get  
10 sometimes confused with Asian names, but I believe  
11 this is the person who is a scientist at the Wuhan  
12 Institute.  
13 Q. And are you aware generally that there's  
14 someone called Shi Zhengli who's described in the  
15 media as the bat woman who does research on bat  
16 coronaviruses at the Wuhan lab --  
17 A. Yeah, is that her? I don't know if that's  
18 the same person. Like I said, when you're dealing  
19 with Asian names, sometimes the first name is last  
20 and the last name is first. So I -- I -- I believe  
21 this is the person from Wuhan.

9 📖 In Alison Young's book, Pandora's Gamble [which I've nearly finished] tells the reader in chapters 13-15 how she fought, using journalist prowess and series of FOIA requests against the [#NIH](#) and labs to uncover a slew of lab incidents that had been hushed up for years!

**Relevant Works by Alison Young:**

Lab-created bird flu virus accident shows lax oversight of risky 'gain of function' research

\*\*\*I personally have read both and recommend both. Also, I do NOT get any form of compensation for recommending this, nor have I asked permission to promote the book. I simply applied the research found in Young's work and find it valuable to public as a whole. I purchased a copy off of amazon so I know it is available if you want to read it.

Award-Winning Investigative Journalist  
**ALISON YOUNG**

**PANDORA'S GAMBLE**

LAB LEAKS, PANDEMICS, AND A WORLD AT RISK

Open Access | Published: 02 May 2012

**Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets**

Masaki Imai, Takiko Watanabe, Masato Hatta, Subash C. Das, Makoto Okawa, Koeko Shimya, Gongxun Zhong, Anthony Hanson, Hiroaki Katsuma, Shinji Watanabe, Chongjun Li, Eriko Kawakami, Shinya Yamada, Maki Kiso, Yusaku Suzuki, Eileen A. Maher, Gabriele Neumann & Yoshihiro Kawaoka <sup>✉</sup>

Nature 486, 425–428 (2012) | [Cite this article](#)


51K Accesses | 1082 Citations | 1206 Altmetric | [Metrics](#)

Madison is the 2nd largest city in the state of Wisconsin putting nearly 270K residents in immediate risk.

Madison is the county seat of Dane County and the capital city of the U.S. state of Wisconsin. As of the 2020 census the population was 269,840, making it the second-largest city in Wisconsin by population, after Milwaukee, and the 80th-largest in the U.S. The city forms the

Chapel Hill is the 17th largest city in North Carolina, placing 61K residents in immediate risk, & a neighboring 2.1 Million at risk as well.

Chapel Hill is a town in Orange and Durham counties in the U.S. state of North Carolina. Its population was 61,960 in the 2020 census, making Chapel Hill the 17th-largest municipality in the state. Chapel Hill, Durham, and the state capital, Raleigh, make up the corners of the Research Triangle (officially the Raleigh–Durham–Cary, NC Combined Statistical Area), with a total population of 2,106,463 in 2020 census.<sup>[38]</sup>



**Tammy Baldwin**


**Born** Tammy Suzanne Green Baldwin  
February 11, 1962 (age 61)  
Madison, Wisconsin, U.S.

**Political party** Democratic

**Domestic partner** Lauren Azar (1998–2010)

**Relations** David E. Green (grandfather)  
Riversia Green Matthews (aunt)  
Andy Samburg (third cousin)

**Education** Smith College (BA)  
University of Wisconsin-Madison (JD)

**Signature** 

**Website** [Senate website](#) <sup>?</sup>

### Gallagher, Colleagues Demand Answers on Biosafety Incident at UW-Madison

April 22, 2023 <sup>1</sup> [Press Release](#)

Now, Mike Gallagher (R-IL) and legislators in Wisconsin's Congressional delegation in demanding answers from the HHS, NIH, and CDC about a **recently exposed** "biosafety lab incident" at UW-Madison. The incident, which potentially exposed individuals to a genetically engineered virus, raises serious questions about the requirements that the HHS, NIH, and CDC have in place to protect the general public from emerging and potentially dangerous viruses.

The letter, which was also signed by Senator Joni Hansen (D-WI) and Reps. Glenn Grothman (D-WI), Bryan Steil (D-WI), Tom Tiffany (R-IN), Scott Fitzgerald (R-IN), and Derrick Scott (D-IN), demands answers from the Director of the HHS, the Director of the NIH, and the Secretary of the HHS and other reported exposure incidents and the oversight problems that the agencies have in place.

*See the letter [here](#) for the full text of the letter.*

Wisconsin's young republicans Representative, Mike Gallagher, along with Johnson, have called an investigation into the covered-up lab incidents at Univ. Wisconsin-Madison. I expect with his military background in the **1st Intelligence Battalion**, as a **Captain**, and his **work in counterintelligence** that he should have ZERO problem getting to the bottom of the matter and demanding accountability.

**But we will have to wait and see.**

Gallagher was a **United States Marine Corps intelligence officer**, serving seven years (2006–13) on active duty. He twice deployed to the *Al Anbar Province*, Iraq, serving on General David Petraeus's CENTCOM Assessment Team as a commander of intelligence teams. He assessed American military strategy in the Middle East Central Asia. He is known as a counterintelligence officer, as a member of the CENTCOM Assessment team.<sup>[1]</sup>

2. Sheahan T, Pooka B, Donatoni E, Cort D. [Bats](#) (2008). Pathways of cross-species transmission of synthetically reconstructed porcine severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus. [Journal of Virology](#), 81(17):8721-32. doi:10.1128/JVI.01660-08
3. Becker MM, Druhan RM, Donatoni E, Cort D, Batts G, Sims AC, Sheahan T, Pooka RB, Cort D, Johnson RE, Batts G. (2008). Synthetic recombination built SARS-like coronavirus is infectious in cultured cells and mice. [Journal of Virology](#), 82(19):9443-9. doi:10.1128/JVI.01944-08
4. Menachery V, Co-Sifler A, Barnum-Johnson KE, Mitchell HD, Eustice AJ, Walters KM, Nicora CD, Purvine SO, Casey CP, Monroe KA, Sheth AK, Brumley KS, Vande Rosten BM, Gramling KL, Tzou SMH, Roth, Waters KM, Sims AC, [Kawaoka T](#), Batts G (2018). [MERS-CoV](#) and H5N1 influenza virus antagonize antigen presentation by altering the endoplasmic reticulum. [Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences](#), 115(11):E1012-E1016. PMID: 29393515
5. [Virus Genetic Platforms](#): The battle between the coronavirus pan-genomes of CoV and DENVs. Several CoV genetic cDNA clones are available in the lab, including SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, seasonal human and novel swine. The genetic diversity of the CoV genome and the use of these genetic platforms allow for detailed studies into the role of viral genes in pathogenesis, immune evasion, animal virulence, vaccine development, and shaping of protein-protein interactions, and virus evolution.
1. Young B, Curtis, K, Fritz E, Hensley L, Johnson P, Prentice E, Cameron M, Giesbert T. [Bats](#) (2005). Reverse Genetics with a Full Length Influenza A Virus Genome. [Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences](#), 102(10): 12995-13000. PMID: 16427473.

3

Pages 29

**Kawaoka is listed a 2nd time, & the research title was: "MERS-CoV & H5N1 influenza virus antagonize antigen presentation by altering the endoplasmic landscape"**

**Is regulation preventing the development of therapeutics that may prevent future coronavirus pandemics?**

**Timothy P. Sheahan<sup>a</sup>\* & Ralph S. Baric<sup>b</sup>**  
<sup>a</sup>Department of Pathobiology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA  
<sup>\*</sup>Author for correspondence: tsheahan@unc.edu

Tst Project	Year Start	Principal Investigator(s)	Organization	Fiscal Year	Admin IC	Funding IC	FY Total Cost by IC	Sponsor Projects
Diagnostic and Prognostic Biomarkers for Viral Severe Lung Disease	2017	N/AID	N/AID	N/AID	\$1,131,261	View >		
Broad-spectrum antiviral GS-5734 to treat MERS-CoV and related emerging CoV	2017	N/AID	N/AID	N/AID	\$1,655,240	View >		
Systems Immunomics of Bioradience and Emerging Pathogens in the Collaborative Cress	2017	N/AID	N/AID	N/AID	\$4,616,531	View >		
Systems Immunomics of Emerging Coronavirus Infections in the Collaborative Cress	2017	N/AID	N/AID	N/AID	\$2,013,134	View >		
Characterization of novel genes encoded by RNA and DNA viruses	2017	N/AID	N/AID	N/AID	\$20,131,344	View >		
Mechanisms of MERS-CoV Entry, Cross-Species Transmission and Pathogenesis	2017	N/AID	N/AID	N/AID	\$73,353,541	View >		

<sup>a,b</sup>Given the massive amount of morbidity and mortality associated with EIDs over the past 30 years, the balance between public health risk and reaction is clear.<sup>14</sup>

First draft submitted: 20 November 2017; Accepted for publication: 27 November 2017; Published online: 21 February 2018

In the last century, hundreds of new emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) have arisen in human populations most of which originate from wild animals as zoonoses [1]. The recent surge of zoonotic EIDs in human populations has been fuelled by a combination of environmental changes including human population growth, growing public health infrastructures, changes in land use and agriculture and ease of global travel. HIV, Ebola virus, avian influenza (H5N1, H7N9), etc. served acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) as a few recent examples of highly virulent, zoonotic viral EIDs that have catastrophically affected global economies and public health [2]. Geopolitical chaos since the 1990s and the potential for weaponising EIDs provided the creation of synthetic pathogens aimed at protecting the US from bioterrorism threats and the accidental release of potential pandemic pathogens from laboratories. Are these policies effective? Are they impacting contemporary development for current and future EIDs? How are they shaping the direction of fundamental research programs, the recruitment of young investigators and the availability of important federal resources across the American scientific landscape to address SARS, MERS-CoV and other zoonotic diseases?

Last Project	Year End	Principal Investigator(s) (Project Leader(s))	Organization	Fiscal Year	Admin IC	Funding IC	FY Total Cost by IC	Similar Projects	Final Project Cost by IC	Similar Projects
Broad-spectrum antiviral BS-5734 to treat MERs-CoV and related emerging CoV										
S1814132178-82		BARBARA BALPHELS, ESQ. SHEKHAN, TIMOTHY PATRICK C.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2016	NAID	NAID	\$1,166,870	<a href="#">View &gt;</a>		
Mechanisms of MERs-CoV Entry, Cross-species Transmission and Pathogenesis										
S1814137898-86		BARBARA BALPHELS, ESQ. LI, JIANG G.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2018	NAID	NAID	\$727,370	<a href="#">View &gt;</a>		
Systems Immunogenetics of Bioterrorism and Emerging Pathogens in the Collaborative Cross										
S1914188625-87		BARBARA BALPHELS, ESQ. HEISE, MARK L.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2018	NAID	NAID	\$2,727,484	<a href="#">View &gt;</a>		
Diagnostic and Prognostic Biomarkers for Viral Severe Lung Disease										
S1914188701-85	8447	BARBARA BALPHELS, ESQ.	COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES	2018	NAID	NAID	\$88,074	<a href="#">View &gt;</a>		
Systems Immunogenetics of Emerging Coronavirus Infections in the Collaborative Cross										
S1914188623-83	7727	BARBARA BALPHELS, ESQ.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2018	NAID	NAID	\$417,667	<a href="#">View &gt;</a>		
Determinants of Coronavirus Fatality in Replication and Pathogenesis										
S2014188197-86		DENSON, MARK R. ESQ. BARBARA BALPHELS, ESQ.	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER	2018	NAID	NAID	\$68,584	<a href="#">View &gt;</a>		
RNA Program Translation Recoding										
S18109072447-18		KIRCHDOERFER, SAMUEL E. ESQ.	UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON	2016	NIAMS	NIAMS			297,861	<a href="#">View &gt;</a>
Coronavirus RNA synthesis by multicompartment protein machines										
S5814158663-03		KIRCHDOERFER, ROBERT N.	UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON	2022	NAID	NAID				
Determining the functions of novel genes for influenza A and Ebola viruses										
S1914187810-82	86	KAWAKURA, YOSHINOBU ESQ.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2014	NAID	NAID			\$272,372	
Determining the functions of novel genes for influenza A and Ebola viruses										
S1914187810-81	86	KAWAKURA, YOSHINOBU ESQ.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2015	NAID	NAID			\$594,996	
Determining the functions of novel genes for influenza A and Ebola viruses										
S1914187810-84	8668	KAWAKURA, YOSHINOBU ESQ.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2016	NAID	NAID			\$276,812	
Determining the functions of novel genes for influenza A and Ebola viruses										
S1914187810-85	8444	KAWAKURA, YOSHINOBU ESQ.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2017	NAID	NAID			\$302,256	
Mechanism of Ebola Virus Pathogenesis and Innate and Adaptive Immunity										
S1914187810-83	1279	KAWAKURA, YOSHINOBU ESQ.	ORION HEALTH & SCIENCE UNIVERSITY	2013	NAID	NAID			\$472,209	
Determining the functions of novel genes for influenza A and Ebola viruses										
S1914187810-81	8444	KAWAKURA, YOSHINOBU ESQ.	UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL	2015	NAID	NAID			\$502,167	

12 🇺🇸 These are two mad scientists to have at their disposal millions of dollars, BSL-3 labs, and the expertise to alter pathogens while having UNACCEPTABLE safety breaches some as recent as 2020. Yet the narrative refuses the possibility that [#WIV](#) could have had a lab leak?

**Madison is the 2nd largest city in the state of Wisconsin putting nearly 270K residents in immediate risk.**

Madison is the county seat of Dane County and the capital city of the U.S. state of Wisconsin. As of the 2020 census the population was 269,840, making it the second-largest city in Wisconsin by population, after Milwaukee, and the 80th-largest in the U.S. The city forms the

**Chapel Hill is the 17th largest city in North Carolina, placing 61K residents in immediate risk, & a neighboring 2.1 Million at risk as well.**

Chapel Hill is a town in Orange and Durham counties in the U.S. state of North Carolina. Its population was 61,960 in the 2020 census, making Chapel Hill the 17th-largest municipality in the state. Chapel Hill, Durham, and the state capital, Raleigh, make up the corners of the Research Triangle (officially the Raleigh-Durham-Cary, NC Combined Statistical Area), with a total population of 2,106,463 in 2020 census.<sup>[38]</sup>

**Coronavirus vaccine development**

Project Number 1Z1A0005125-03 NIDR ANNUAL REPORT	Contact PI/Project Leader GRAHAM, BARNIE	Awardee Organization NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES
FOA NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	Administering Institutes or Centers NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	Project Start Date
Study Section	CFDA Code	Project End Date
Fiscal Year 2016	DUNS Number	Budget Start Date
Award Notice Date	UEI	Budget End Date
	N/A	N/A

**Project Funding Information for 2016**

Year	Funding IC	Direct Costs	Indirect Costs	PI Total Cost by IC
2016	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases			\$163,136

**Determinants of Coronavirus Fidelity in Replication and Pathogenesis**

Project Number 5R01AI108197-05	Contact PI/Project Leader DENSON, MARK R	Awardee Organization VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Contact PI/Project Leader Name: DENSON, MARK R Title: PROFESSOR OF PEDIATRICS	Other PIs Name: BAIRC, RALPH S Title: PROFESSOR OF PEDIATRICS	Program Official Name: STERNBY, ERIN J Contact: [redacted] View Email
Contact FOA PA-11-260	Administering Institutes or Centers NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	Project Start Date 01-August-2013
Study Section Virology - B Study Section(008)	CFDA Code 855	Project End Date 28-February-2018
Fiscal Year 2016	DUNS Number 079917897	Budget Start Date 01-August-2016
Award Notice Date 07-July-2016	UEI 07FLHJH0005	Budget End Date 28-February-2018

**Project Funding Information for 2016**

Year	Funding IC	Direct Costs	Indirect Costs	PI Total Cost by IC
2016	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases	\$460,129	\$98,674	\$558,803

**Role of innate immune responses in the activity of an Alphavirus based adjuvant.**

Project Number 5R01AI088250-04	Contact PI/Project Leader JOHNSTON, ROBERT E	Awardee Organization GLOBAL VACCINES, INC.
Organization Name: GLOBAL VACCINES, INC. City: RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK Country: UNITED STATES (US)	Department Type Unavailable Organization Type Other Domestic Non-Profits	State Code NC Congressional District 04
Other Information FOA: PA-10-067 Study Section: Special Emphasis Panel(ZRG1-MMA-G)(2)(M) Fiscal Year: 2014	Administering Institutes or Centers NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES CFDA Code: 855 DUNS Number: 607832719 Award Notice Date: 07-November-2013	Project Start Date: 01-December-2010 Project End Date: 30-November-2015 Budget Start Date: 01-December-2013

13 🇺🇸 Global Vaccine Inc, funded for producing adjuvants for CoV vaccines, is from NC & works in tandem w/ UNC-CH, & Duke as a consortium called [#NCBiotech](#). 4 of the recent FDA commissioners are members, 2 are on Resilience's board currently.

**Role of innate immune responses in the activity of an Alphavirus based adjuvant.**

1R01AI088250-01	JOHNSTON, ROBERT E	GLOBAL VACCINES, INC.	2011	NAID	NAID	\$385,121
5R01AI088250-02	JOHNSTON, ROBERT E	GLOBAL VACCINES, INC.	2012	NAID	NAID	\$566,898
5R01AI088250-04	JOHNSTON, ROBERT E	GLOBAL VACCINES, INC.	2014	NAID	NAID	\$566,898
5R01AI088250-03	JOHNSTON, ROBERT E	GLOBAL VACCINES, INC.	2013	NAID	NAID	\$532,884

These Alphavirus adjuvants also included coronavirus vaccines, done from 2011-2014 by the Global Vaccines Inc, which turns out is from North Carolina.

**Global Vaccines Inc.**

Global Vaccines is a not-for-profit company that develops vaccines against developing-country diseases such as HIV/AIDS, polio, dengue fever, malaria and viral diarrhea (rotavirus).

**Company Details**

408 Dragonfly Trail Chapel Hill NC 27517	Company type Biopharma Company	Year founded 2002
P.O. Box 14827 Research Triangle Park NC 27709	Employment range in NC 1-19	US headquarters North Carolina
Phone (919) 942-3030	Global headquarters United States	Primary site activity Research and Development
County Chatham	All company activities Research and Development	Core capabilities Tissue Culture and Tissue Engineering
Region Triangle	Potential end market(s) Vaccines Immunologic and inflammatory Diseases Biodefense Infectious Diseases - Viral	Products under development Novel Adjuvant, New Live Attenuated Virus Vaccines

**North Carolina Biotechnology Center.** NCBiotech News

There are already 2 Global Vaccine Institute of North Carolina members that are former FDA commissioners & BOTH (McLellan, Gottlieb) sit on the Board for Moderna's C19 Manufacturer, Resilience

And now, since 2019 a Former UNC Chapel Hill Researcher/ GVI-NC member, Ned Sharpless, was named the new acting FDA Chief to replace Scott Gottlieb

March 20, 2019  
Former UNC-CH Researcher Ned Sharpless Named Acting FDA Chief

Norman E. "Ned" Sharpless, M.D., who is currently director of the National Cancer Institute, was named acting commissioner Tuesday to replace FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. Gottlieb unexpectedly announced his resignation March 5.

For a total of 4 consecutive FDA Commissioners coming from the same research group on NC.  
(Califf, Gottlieb, McLellan, & Sharpless)

**Former UNC-CH Researcher Ned Sharpless Named Acting FDA Chief**

Cancer Institute (NCI) was named acting commissioner Tuesday to replace FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. Gottlieb unexpectedly announced his resignation March 5.

Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar, who made the appointment, said "Dr. Sharpless' deep scientific background and expertise will make him a strong leader for FDA." He will take over early next month and lead the agency until a permanent replacement is named.

Sharpless joined the NCI in October 2017 after serving as director of the University of North Carolina's Lineberger Comprehensive Cancer Center. He also founded or co-founded two Research Triangle-based biotechnology startup companies, Saphire Bio (formerly Healthspan Diagnostics) and G1 Therapeutics (formerly G-Zero Therapeutics).

Bryant Haskins, NCBiotech Writer  
Wed, 03/20/2019



14 🇺🇸 [#Resilience](#), or Government Resilience Services, manufactures the C19 jabs for [#Moderna](#). On their board sits Scott Gottlieb and Mark McLellan, two former FDA commissioners. Both plus Califf, and Sharpless also held the position at the [#FDA](#).

**NCBiotech supports Sharpless' science**

The North Carolina Biotechnology Center made two loans to G-Zero Therapeutics (now G1 Therapeutics), co-founded by Sharpless. They were in 2011 and 2012, totaling \$475,000, and were subsequently repaid.

NCBiotech also awarded a 2014 Technology Enhancement Grant to UNC's tech transfer office for a project for which Sharpless was the principal investigator.

"It will be an honor to advance the FDA's critical public health mission and build on its progress toward the priorities laid out by President Trump, Secretary Azar, and Commissioner Gottlieb," Sharpless said in a statement.

Gottlieb — who has made lowering drug costs and spurring pharmaceutical innovation top priorities during his two years at the FDA — said in an email to employees that Sharpless "shares our mission and I know he will be embraced warmly by the Agency's professional staff."

Sharpless closely follows another highly respected physician and medical researcher from the Research Triangle — Robert Califf, M.D. — who served as acting FDA commissioner during the first year of the Obama Administration. Califf was a professor of medicine and vice chancellor for clinical and translational research at Duke University at the time of his appointment in February 2010. He has since returned to Duke, where he is the Donald F. Fortin, M.D. Professor of Cardiology in the School of Medicine and a member of the Duke Clinical Research Institute.

**ALSO, Former FDA commissioner during the Obama Administration, in 2016, Robert Califf was the Vice Chancellor for clinical research at Duke University & a contributor to the Global Vaccine Institute and NCBiotech Group.**

**Many Triangle health professionals gain prominence**

Sharpless and Califf aren't the only Triangle area health professionals to make good on state, national and international stages.

- Bill Roper, M.D., Ph.D., recently was named interim president of the UNC System. Roper also serves as vice-chancellor for medical affairs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is a former director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an administrator in the Health Care Financing Administration, and previously held positions in the White House for both Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.
- Victor Dzau, M.D., left his position as president and CEO of the Duke University Medical Center in 2014 to become president of the prestigious National Academy of Medicine in Washington, D.C. Dzau, who maintains a home in Durham, has also served on the NCBiotech board of directors.
- Former FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan, M.D., Ph.D., served under President George W. Bush from 2002 to 2004. McClellan is now director of the Duke-Margolis Center for Health Policy and the Robert J. Margolis Professor of Business, Medicine, and Policy at Duke. He is a doctor and an economist whose work has addressed a wide range of strategies and policy reforms to improve health care, including payment reforms to promote better outcomes and lower costs, methods for development and use of real-world evidence, and approaches for more effective drug and device innovation.

Nobel Laureates who remain active in North Carolina life science research include:

- Robert Lefkowitz, Ph.D., of Duke University, who won the chemistry prize in 2012; and
- Duke researcher Paul Modrich, Ph.D., and Aziz Sancar, M.D., Ph.D., of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who shared the prize in chemistry in 2015 with Swedish scientist Tomas Lindahl.

15 🇺🇸 How the government can turn a blind eye to the multiple covered up lab incidents on American soil, continue to fund those at fault, & risk the lives of everyone is CRIMINAL. I want more than answers I WANT ACCOUNTABILITY- NOW! [@RandPaul](#) [@VigilantFox](#) [@SenRonJohnson](#) [@WhiteHouse](#)

LINKS:

NYT article, mystery pneumonia china 2020:

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/world/asia/china-SARS-pneumonia-like.html>

USA today article:



**Lab-created bird flu virus accident shows lax oversight of risky 'gain o...**  
 New book reveals lax oversight and efforts to avoid reporting an accident involving a controversial flu virus at a University of Wisconsin lab.

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2023/04/11/lab-leak-accident-h-5-n-1-virus-avi...>

gallaghers letter to HHS, NIH, CDC over UW-M

<https://files.constantcontact.com/bof4boecf701/4e39a8e7-475f-432a-a944-14cd9b9e970b.pdf?rdr=true>

Kawaoka at UNC Chapel Hill Research 2015:

[https://reporter.nih.gov/search/BsqedYDnKk-vTMgNdFE\\_Bw/projects](https://reporter.nih.gov/search/BsqedYDnKk-vTMgNdFE_Bw/projects)

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